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ABSTRACT
On the first day of each year, Public Domain Day celebrates the
moment when copyrights expire, and books, films, songs, and other creative
works enter the public domain, where they become, in Justice Brandeis’s
words, “free as the air to common use.” Educators, students, artists, and
fans can use them with neither permission nor payment. Online archives
can digitize and make them fully available without the threat of lawsuits or
licensing demands. Sadly, in the United States, as a result of copyright term
extensions, not a single published work will enter the public domain in
2014. In fact, almost no works created during most readers’ lifetimes will
become completely free for them to redistribute and reuse, unless the rights
holders affirmatively decide otherwise.
In this Article, I will briefly trace the history and consequences of this
legally imposed impoverishment of the public domain. But, I argue, this is
only part of the story. Increasingly, private initiatives are trying to build
zones of legal freedom that simulate some attributes of the public domain.
At the same time, there are global copyright reform efforts to limit the
negative effects of term extension, at least with regard to “orphan works”—
those that have no identifiable or locatable copyright holder. Although
these efforts are no substitute for a more complete reform of copyright,
collectively, they do transform the legal situation substantially. Thus, while
Public Domain Day in the United States may seem like an empty
celebration, it is also a reminder of this newfound complexity in our
copyright landscape.
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INTRODUCTION: WHAT STREAMS FEED THE PUBLIC DOMAIN?
In Europe, January 1st, 2014 will be the day when the works of Fats
Waller, Nikola Tesla, Sergei Rachmaninoff, Elinor Glyn, and hundreds of
other authors emerge into the public domain.1 In Canada, where the
copyright term is shorter, a wealth of material—including works from
W.E.B. Du Bois, Robert Frost, Aldous Huxley, C.S. Lewis, and Sylvia
Plath—will join the realm of free culture.2
What is entering the public domain in the United States on January
1? Not a single published work.3 Why? In 1998, Congress added twenty
years to the copyright term.4 But this term extension was not only granted to
future works; it was retroactively applied to existing works.5 For works
created after 1977, the term was extended to life plus 70 years for natural
authors, and to 95 years after publication for works of corporate
authorship.6 For works published between 1923 and 1977 that were still in
copyright, the terms were extended to 95 years from publication, keeping
them out of the public domain for an additional 20 years.7 The public

1

The European Union has a term of life plus 70 years, so the creations of authors
who died in 1943 will enter the public domain on January 1, 2014: the beginning of
the year after copyright expiration. Council Directive 2006/116, art. 1, 2006 O.J. (L
372) (EC).
2
Canada’s term is life plus 50 years, so the works of authors who died in 1963 will
enter the public domain in 2014. Canada Copyright Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-42, s. 6.
3
There is one subset of works that will enter the United States public domain on
January 1, 2014: unpublished works that were created by authors who died in 1943
and were not registered with the Copyright Office before 1978. 17 U.S.C. § 303
(2012). However, this is a limited category—it can be difficult to determine
whether works were “unpublished” for copyright purposes, and, in general, users
are less likely to encounter these works because they were never published.
Therefore, this Article focuses on the millions of published works that are being
kept from the public domain. (Copyright’s publication rules can also mean that
some works published before 1923 are still under copyright, if their initial
publication was not authorized, because the current 95-year term only begins on the
date of authorized publication. So, for example, a work from 1800 that was not
properly published until 1957 could, if its copyright was renewed, be in-copyright
until 2053. 17 U.S.C. § 304(b).)
4
Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827
(1998).
5
Christina N. Gifford, The Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, 30 U. MEM.
L. REV. 363, 381 (2000) (“The overall effect of section 102 of the CTEA is to
extend the term of most existing copyrights, whether in the original term or the
renewal term, by a period of twenty years.”).
6
17 U.S.C. § 302.
7
17 U.S.C. § 304.
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domain was frozen in time, and artifacts from 1923 won’t enter it until
2019.
The Supreme Court rejected a challenge to this retroactive term
extension in 2003.8 Deferring substantially to Congress,9 the Court held that
the law did not violate the constitutional requirement that copyrights last for
“limited Times.”10 In addition, the Court declined to apply heightened First
Amendment scrutiny, rejecting the petitioners’ argument that term
extension unconstitutionally restricted the public’s ability to make speechrelated uses of older works.11 Then, in 2012, the Court went a step further,
and ruled that Congress may constitutionally remove works from the public
domain, even though citizens—including orchestra conductors, educators,
librarians, and film archivists—were already legally using them.12
According to the majority opinion, while copyright owners had legally
protected rights during the copyright term, the public had no First
Amendment rights to use material in the public domain: “Anyone has free
access to the public domain, but no one, after the copyright term has
expired, acquires ownership rights in the once-protected works.”13 The
dissenting Justices’ disagreement was forceful: “By removing material from
the public domain, the statute, in literal terms, ‘abridges’ a preexisting
freedom to speak.”14
This impoverishment of the public domain stands in stark contrast
to the original purpose and history of our copyright laws. As Justice Story
explained, the Constitutional purpose of copyright is to “promote the
progress of science and the useful arts, and admit the people at large, after a
short interval, to the full possession and enjoyment of all writings and

8

Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
Id. at 222 (“The wisdom of Congress’ action . . . is not within our province to
second guess.”).
10
Id. at 209–10; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
11
See id. at 221 (“The First Amendment securely protects the freedom to make—or
decline to make—one’s own speech; it bears less heavily when speakers assert the
right to make other people's speeches.”).
12
Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012).
13
Id. at 892. By this logic, the copyright system is asymmetric by design: it is
concerned only with “ownership rights,” not speech rights, and there can be no
“ownership rights” in the public domain.
14
Id. at 907 (Breyer, J., dissenting). In their dissent, Justices Breyer and Alito
framed the question thus: “[D]oes the [Constitution] empower Congress to enact a
statute that withdraws works from the public domain, brings about higher prices
and costs, and in doing so seriously restricts dissemination, particularly to those
who need it for scholarly, educational, or cultural purposes—all without providing
any additional incentive for the production of new material? . . . [T]he answer is
no.” Id. at 903 (emphasis in original).
9
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inventions without restraint.”15 Accordingly, the original copyright term
lasted for 14 years, with the option to renew for another 14 years.16 Until
1978, the maximum copyright term was 56 years: 28 years from the date of
publication, renewable for another 28 years.17
Under that relatively recent term, works published in 1957 would
enter the public domain on January 1, 2014. These include books ranging
from Jack Kerouac’s On The Road18 to Ayn Rand’s Atlas Shrugged19 to Dr.
Seuss’s The Cat in the Hat.20 (A variety of constituencies would have cause
for celebration.) Joining those books would be the classic films The Bridge
on the River Kwai,21 Funny Face,22 and A Farewell to Arms,23 as well as the
first episodes of Leave It to Beaver.24 Under current law, they will remain
under copyright until 2053. And famous creations like these are only the
beginning. Most works from 1957 are out of circulation—a Congressional
Research Service study suggested that only 2 percent of works between 55
and 75 years old continue to retain commercial value.25

15

JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §
1147 (1833). The Copyright Clause provides that Congress shall have Power to
“promote the Progress of Science . . . by securing for limited Times to Authors . . .
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
Copyright “promotes the progress” in part by ensuring that creative works pass into
the public domain. See Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464
U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (“[Copyright] is intended to motivate the creative activity of
authors and inventors by the provision of special reward, and to allow the public
access to the products of their genius after the limited period of exclusive control
has expired.”).
16
Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124.
17
Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 23, 35 Stat. 1075 [hereinafter 1909 Copyright
Act].
18
JACK KEROUAC, ON THE ROAD (1957).
19
AYN RAND, ATLAS SHRUGGED (1957).
20
DR. SEUSS, THE CAT IN THE HAT (1957).
21
THE BRIDGE ON THE RIVER KWAI (Columbia Pictures 1957).
22
FUNNY FACE (Paramount Pictures 1957).
23
A FAREWELL TO ARMS (Selznick Studio 1957).
24
E.g., Leave It To Beaver: The Perfume Salesmen (CBS television broadcast Dec.
27, 1957); Leave It To Beaver: It’s a Small World (CBS television broadcast Apr.
23, 1957).
25
Eldred, 537 U.S. at 248 (Breyer, J., dissenting (citing Brief for Petitioners at 7)).
The petitioners, citing a Congressional Research Service report, concluded that
“[u]nder current law, 3.35 million works would be blocked to protect 77,000,” or
about 2 percent. See Brief for Petitioners at 7 (citing EDWARD RAPPAPORT, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., REPORT NO. 98-144 E, COPYRIGHT TERM EXTENSION:
ESTIMATING THE ECONOMIC VALUES (1998), available at http://ipmall.info/
hosted_resources/crs/98-144.pdf).
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Those who wish to use such works legally face a series of potential
roadblocks. Finding the rights holders of commercially unavailable works
can be especially difficult, as the relevant documentation is often lost or
buried. These challenges are compounded by the abandonment of
“formalities,” which coincided with the term extension.26 Until 1978, the
law required copyright owners either to affix a simple notice to their works
showing their name and the year of publication, or to register unpublished
works with the Copyright Office, in order to receive copyright protection.27
To maintain copyright, they needed to renew claims with the Copyright
Office after an initial term.28 These requirements produced an evidentiary
trail that, in practice, provided the public with basic information about
copyright ownership and status—a predicate to efficiently obtaining
permission or a license. Without this information, the initial “search costs”
can themselves be insurmountable—those who wish to negotiate terms of
use cannot find the rights holders in the first place—giving rise to “orphan
works.”29 Productive uses are foregone, and forgotten works remain off
limits. This legal gridlock entrenches the dividing line between copyright
and the public domain, but its costs fall on both sides of that line; in the
absence of information neither works under copyright, nor those in the
public domain, will be efficiently used.30
26

The United States began to repeal formalities with the Copyright Act of 1976,
which took effect in 1978. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541. Between 1978 and
March 1, 1989, copyright owners who published without notice were required to
register their works within 5 years to maintain protection. Id. After March 1989, no
notice or subsequent fix was required. Berne Convention Implementation Act of
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853.
27
1909 Copyright Act, supra note 17, §§ 9, 11, 18. In addition to notice and
registration, the copyright proprietor was required to “promptly deposit” copies of
the work with the Copyright Office. Id. at § 12.
28
1909 Copyright Act, supra note 17, § 23.
29
See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON COPYRIGHT AND DIGITAL DISTANCE
EDUCATION 165 (May 1999), http://www.copyright.gov/reports/de_rprt.pdf. This is
especially true for older works, because their copyrights have often been transferred
numerous times, without a clear chain of title. Publishing industry consolidation has
exacerbated these challenges.
30
Recently, copyright formalities have been the subject of renewed interest. See,
e.g., 17th Annual BCLT/BTLJ Symposium: Reform(aliz)ing Copyright for the
Internet Age?, BERKELEY LAW SCHOOL, http://www.law.berkeley.edu/
formalities.htm (Apr. 18–19, 2013). This is because technology has upended the
traditional wisdom about formalities. The downside of formalities—the danger that
creators who were unfamiliar or unable to comply with them might unnecessarily
forfeit protection—has been minimized by technology that allows compliance
without great difficulty or expense. The upside of formalities—providing the
information necessary for efficient use—has become more important than ever,
because of the unprecedented availability of creative material online. Both
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The removal of the renewal requirement further diminished the
public domain, by creating copyrights that persisted over works that had
exhausted their commercial potential. With renewal, if works were still
valuable at the end of their first term, that would provide the incentive to
renew; but if not, then the work could pass into the public domain, where it
might prove valuable to others.31 A 1961 study showed that 85 percent of all
copyrights were not renewed, and some 93 percent of copyrights in books
were not renewed.32 All of those works went immediately into the public
domain. Under current law, however, for the majority of older works, no
one is reaping the benefits from continued protection, yet they remain
presumptively copyrighted.
The general elimination of formalities had an additional effect. It
meant that for the first time the realm of “informal culture”—diaries, home
movies, personal photographs—entered the realm of copyright, whether the
creators wished it or not. These amateur works, invaluable in detailing our
cultural history, are even more likely to be “orphan works” and thus, barring
assertions of fair use, effectively off limits to those who would digitize them
or use them to chronicle our past. Because these works, too, were subject to
the twenty-year term extension, a large swath of informal history became
practically unavailable.
These costs in terms of speech and accessibility are high, but what
about the countervailing benefits? Copyright’s central economic rationale is
that exclusive rights spur creativity. However, the incentive effect from
prospective term extension is negligible, and from retrospective term
extension, nonexistent. The 1998 law lengthened the term from life plus 50
to life plus 70 years for natural authors, and from 75 years to 95 years after
publication for corporate “works made for hire.” Could this extra 20 years
of protection, decades in the future, provide additional incentives to
authors? The economic evidence suggests that the answer is no. Only a
minuscule percentage of works retain commercial value by this time.33 For
the term extension to stimulate new creation, authors would have to be
incentivized by the remote possibility that their heirs or successors-indevelopments weigh in favor of reintroducing formalities. See generally
Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STAN. L. REV. 485 (2004).
31
See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 210–12 (2009) (“[F]ewer than 11% of the
copyrights registered between 1883 and 1964 were renewed at the end of their
twenty-eight year term, even though the cost of renewal was small.”).
32
Barbara A. Ringer, Renewal of Copyright, in STUDIES PREPARED FOR THE S.
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, SUBCOMMITTEE ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND
COPYRIGHTS, 86TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION 187, 220–221 (Comm. Print
1961).
33
See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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interest would continue to receive revenue beyond the previous terms of life
plus 50 years or 75 years after publication. A team of eminent economists
estimated that “a 1% likelihood of earning $100 annually for 20 years,
starting 75 years into the future, is worth less than seven cents today”34—
hardly a compelling economic incentive. And, of course, lengthening the
term for works that have already been produced provides no new incentives
at all.
Incentives aside, another purported benefit of term extension was
that the additional twenty years would encourage rights holders to restore
and redistribute their older works. Empirical studies show otherwise:35 it is
not rights holders who wish to digitize and redistribute their older
catalogues. It is non-owners who are waiting to do so. When books fall out
of copyright, they are more likely to be in print, and available in more
editions and formats.36 Preservationists, not copyright holders, are digitizing
deteriorating films and sound recordings, and term extension is inhibiting
their efforts.37 Therefore, keeping older works under copyright frequently
frustrates, rather than promotes, their maintenance and dissemination. In the
end, while reasonable minds can disagree about the constitutionality of

34

Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 255 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis
in original) (citing Brief for George A. Akerlof et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at App. 3a (No. 01-618), at 2002 WL 1041846, at *1AA). See also
I.P.L. Png & Qiu-hong Wang, Copyright Law and the Supply of Creative Work:
Evidence from the Movies 3–4 (April 2009), http://www.comp.nus.edu.sg/
~ipng/research/copyrt.pdf (empirical study of OECD countries showing no
statistically significant correlation between copyright term extension and higher
movie production).
35
See generally Paul J. Heald, Property Rights and the Efficient Exploitation of
Copyrighted Works: An Empirical Analysis of Public Domain and Copyrighted
Fiction Best Sellers, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1031 (2008).
36
See generally id. (empirical comparison of “durable” public domain and
copyrighted bestsellers showing that the public domain works were available in
more editions and at lower prices, and more likely to be in print); Christopher
Buccafusco and Paul J. Heald, Do Bad Things Happen When Works Enter the
Public Domain?: Empirical Tests of Copyright Term Extension, 28 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1 (2013) (empirical comparison showing that audio books made from
public domain bestsellers were “significantly more available” than those of
copyrighted bestsellers).
37
Brief for Hal Roach Studios et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Eldred
v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618), 2002 WL 1041856, at *10–*11;
TIM BROOKS, NATIONAL RECORDING PRESERVATION BOARD, SURVEY OF REISSUES
OF U.S. RECORDINGS vi (2005), available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/record/
nrpb/pub133.pdf.
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retrospective term extension, it is difficult to argue that the benefits
outweigh the costs.38 The available evidence strongly suggests otherwise.
So, one answer to “What will enter the public domain in 2014?” is
simple, and distressing: “Nothing.” The counterfactual above provides some
sense of what we have lost by showing what could have enriched the public
domain, under the law in effect until 1978. But this is only part of the
picture. As recent scholarship on intellectual property points out, the public
domain—with its promise of meaningful access to copyrighted works—is
not a single, static concept.39 After all, expiration of the term of protection
has never been the only avenue for ensuring access. At its core, the public
domain is the realm of material that is entirely free because copyright has
lapsed. But even as the length of today’s copyright term erects a stubborn
barrier around this core, other zones of freedom are developing around it.
This Article will map a series of efforts to secure freedoms that
mimic key features of the public domain. These efforts include: 1)
promoting broad public access through the fair use doctrine, 2) making
material available under open access licenses, 3) enacting orphan works
reform, and 4) identifying works already within the public domain. As I will
discuss, each of these capitalizes on the opportunities available in the
absence of the gridlock that dominates other aspects of the copyright
system. Fair uses by definition do not require permission, and are evaluated
in court according to a set of rules designed to balance competing interests.
While fair use empowers users, open licenses can empower authors by
giving them a tool to affirmatively articulate the freedoms they wish to
associate with their creations. Orphan works reform steps in to facilitate
projects that are prevented for no good reason—there is no downside to
allowing uses of orphan works, because no rights holder can be found to
benefit from their exploitation. Finally, identifying and tagging public
domain works employs specialized expertise in order to overcome
transaction costs.
These developments are promising and in some cases
transformative. On the one hand, they present a necessary caution against
sweeping conclusions about the cultural costs of the changes that have
38

Another justification for term extension was harmonization with the European
Union, where the term was life plus seventy years. However, the Copyright Term
Extension Act did not actually harmonize the United States and European Union
copyright terms—it created different terms for all “works made for hire” and for all
pre-1978 works. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 257–58 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
39
See James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the
Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 62 (Winter/Spring 2003) (“The
public domain will change its shape according to the hopes it embodies, the fears it
tries to lay to rest, and the implicit vision of creativity on which it rests. There is not
one public domain, but many.”)
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expanded copyright’s term and reach, and diminished the formalities and
evidentiary requirements to receive a copyright in the first place. Yet, on the
other hand, the developments I will chart out are also limited in their reach,
given the phenomena they try to address. Thus, my hope is that this Article
will offer a greater understanding of not only the complexities of “the public
domain problem” but also of its sheer scale.

I. HARNESSING FAIR USE’S FREEDOMS
The “fair use” exception in Section 107 of the Copyright Act is
flexible by design, and has adapted to meet new challenges posed by legal
and technological change. Over time, fair use has safeguarded copying
over-the-air broadcasts for purposes of time-shifting,40 reverse engineering
software for purposes of interoperability,41 making commercial parodies of
copyrighted works,42 and displaying thumbnails in image search engines.43
In developing this doctrine, the courts over the last twenty years have
particularly stressed the need to safeguard “transformative” uses. According
to the Supreme Court, transformative uses “lie at the heart of the fair use
doctrine’s guarantee of breathing space.”44 A transformative use is one that
does not “supersede[] the objects of the original creation,” but rather “adds
something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the
first with new expression, meaning, or message.”45 In April 2013, in a case
involving appropriation art,46 the Second Circuit granted an especially wide
berth to transformative works, holding that “[t]he law imposes no
requirement that a work comment on the original or its author in order to be
considered transformative, and a secondary work may constitute a fair use
even if it serves some purpose other than those (criticism, comment, news

40

Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992).
42
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
43
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007).
44
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
45
Id.
46
William Landes provides a useful definition of appropriation art:
Appropriation art borrows images from popular culture,
advertising, the mass media, other artists and elsewhere, and
incorporates them into new works of art. Often, the artist’s
technical skills are less important than his conceptual ability to
place images in different settings and, thereby, change their
meaning.
William Landes, Copyright, Borrowed Images and Appropriation Art: An
Economic Approach 1, (University of Chicago Law Sch. John M. Olin Law &
Economics Working Paper No. 113, 2001) (citations omitted), available at
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/files/113.WML_.Copyright.pdf.
41
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reporting, teaching, scholarship, and research) identified in the preamble to
the statute.”47
This evolution provides the backdrop for two cases determining
whether fair use can facilitate access to the wealth of knowledge contained
within books. Both address uses stemming from Google’s Mass Digitization
Project. Since 2004, Google has created digital scans of more than twenty
million books from libraries around the country, for use by both Google and
the libraries.48 The vast majority of these titles—93 percent—are
nonfiction.49
Not surprisingly, Google used these scans to build a search engine
for books (“Google Books”). It did not obtain the permission of copyright
holders because doing so would have made the project impossible—there
were millions of copyrighted books and the majority of these were out-ofprint, meaning that many rights holders could not be traced.50 On November
14, 2013, the Southern District of New York issued an opinion holding that
Google’s activities—including scanning copyrighted books and displaying
snippets from them in response to search queries—were protected by the
fair use doctrine.51 Among other things, the court found that Google Books
was “highly transformative”: it transformed the expressive text within
books into a new and valuable search tool.52 “Words” were transformed into
“pointers.”53
Notably, the decision’s fair use analysis was bookended by parallel
discussions of the “significant public benefits” of Google Books.54 These
benefits were wide-ranging: 1) helping people to efficiently find books that
were “once buried in research library archives,” 2) allowing scholars to
track the evolution of language through text-mining, 3) facilitating access to
books for print-disabled individuals and underserved populations, 4)
preserving books through digitization—particularly older, fragile titles, and
5) benefiting the authors and publishers themselves by generating new
audiences and revenue streams.55 In the words of the court: “Indeed, all
47

Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 706 (2d Cir. 2013).
Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc., No. 05 Civ. 8136(DC), 2013 WL 6017130, at
*1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2013).
49
Id. at *2.
50
Id.
51
Id. The publishers have settled with Google, so the remaining case only involves
authors. This decision marked the culmination of eight years of litigation, including
a settlement agreement rejected by the court and interim decisions about procedural
issues.
52
Id. at *8.
53
Id.
54
Id. at *10.
55
Id. at *4–*5, *10.
48
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society benefits.”56 Moreover, these benefits were coextensive with
copyright’s objective of promoting widespread access to creative works.57
By emphasizing the public benefits provided by Google Books, the
court declined to entangle itself in the formalistic question of whether
Google’s intermediate activities—including scanning entire books58—were
themselves infringing. Instead, it focused on Google’s overriding purpose
and end result: building a tool that allowed users, for the first time, to search
the text within millions of books. One could argue that in doing so, the
court implicitly followed a principle of “technological neutrality” recently
endorsed by the Canadian Supreme Court,59 and avoided dooming a
valuable activity merely because of the technological method used to
achieve it. Creating an analog index—through, say, transcribing the relevant
terms—would not require the large-scale copying of entire books. Creating
a digital index does require such copying. In fact, it is the full-text scans that
enable a far more efficient and comprehensive index than was possible in
the analog world. Dwelling on the process rather than the outcome would,
perversely, “impose a gratuitous cost for the use of more efficient, Internetbased technologies.”60
The court’s finding of fair use was premised on both Google
Books’ public benefits and its accommodation for private rights: As the
judge explained, “[Google Books] advances the progress of the arts and
sciences, while maintaining respectful consideration for the rights of authors
and other creative individuals, and without adversely impacting the rights of
copyright holders.”61 To avoid interfering with copyright owners’ markets,
Google Books did not display the full text of in-copyright books; instead, it
displayed no more than three short snippets (about an eighth of a page)
showing the pertinent term, with no advertising.62 Added security measures
56

Id. at *10.
Id.
58
The copyright owner has the exclusive right to “reproduce the copyrighted work
in copies.” 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2012).
59
See Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Soc’y of Composers, Authors and Music
Publishers of Canada, 2012 S.C.C. 34 ¶¶ 2, 5.
60
Id. at ¶ 9. This is not a minor point: our current Copyright Act dates from 1976,
when unlicensed “copies” were more likely to represent infringements. Now, copies
are routinely implicated in any activity that uses digital technology, and many of
these activities are non-infringing. Isolating intermediate copies, rather than
focusing on the overall use, could lead to counterintuitive results. See, e.g., MAI
Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir.1993) (holding that
repairing a computer created an infringing “copy” by temporarily loading the
copyrighted operating system software into the computer’s random access
memory).
61
Authors Guild, 2013 WL 6017130 at *10.
62
Id. at *3.
57
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made it impossible for an unscrupulous user to patch together any
substantial portion of the book.63 For those who wanted to read the entire
book, an “About the Book” page provided links to booksellers and libraries
where the book could be obtained.64 As a result, Google Books potentially
created, rather than displaced, book sales—both by helping readers locate
books they otherwise would not have found and by linking them to retailers.
Future projects that do not implement reasonable measures safeguarding
rights holders’ interests may not pass fair use muster.
As part of its agreement with participating libraries, Google allowed
them to download digital copies of the titles scanned from their
collections.65 (Two of the beneficial uses highlighted by the Google Books
decision were related to this library partnership: preserving books and
providing better access.) An earlier court decision from 2012 independently
vindicated the libraries’ own rights to use their digital scans.66 There,
HathiTrust—a partnership of major research institutions and libraries—had
used its digital repository for the purposes of full-text searching,
preservation, and access for people with print disabilities.67 The court held
that these uses were transformative, and protected by the fair use doctrine,
in unequivocal language: “I cannot imagine a definition of fair use that
would not encompass the transformative uses made by Defendants’ MDP
[Mass Digitization Project] and would require that I terminate this
invaluable contribution to the progress of science and cultivation of the
arts.”68
If upheld on appeal, these two cases offer an important guideline:
fair use determinations should be informed by copyright’s purpose. As the
HathiTrust court explained: “The ultimate focus is the goal of copyright
itself, whether ‘promoting the Progress of Science and useful Arts’ would
be better served by allowing the use than by preventing it.’”69 As a
corollary, when technology is involved, courts should adopt the principle of
technological neutrality, and focus on the end result of a beneficial activity,
rather than whether its technological process happens to entail copying (or
63

Id. In addition, one snippet per page and at least 10% of pages in each book were
“black-listed,” meaning they would not be displayed. Also, the system would not
offer different snippets for the same search query, and the snippets were presented
as an image, so that a user could not copy and paste the text. Id.
64
Id.
65
Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 902 F. Supp. 2d 445, 448 (N.D. Ga. 2012).
66
Id.
67
Id. at 448. These uses by libraries are sanctioned both by the fair use doctrine and
other provisions of the Copyright Act. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 108, 121 (2012).
68
Id. at 464.
69
Id. at 458 (citing Swatch Grp. Mgmt. Servs. Ltd. v. Bloomberg L.P., 861 F. Supp.
2d 336, 339–40 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)).
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other incidental, copyright-significant acts). Thus understood, the adaptive
fair use doctrine can provide a viable legal mechanism for securing digital
access to our collective culture.
Fair use protection is especially important for mass digitization
projects—particularly those that preserve historical collections—because
the transaction costs would otherwise be exponential.70 Many rights holders
cannot be found, and for the remainder, the expense and logistical hurdles
associated with scores of discrete negotiations would derail even a modest
project. Fair use provides an alternative to the gridlock resulting from the
term extensions detailed earlier. Endeavors such as Google Books and
HathiTrust’s Digital Library are possible precisely because no permission is
required. If the project is challenged, then the use is evaluated in an
impartial court according to specific rules, rather than through piecemeal
bargaining subject to the manifold preferences of private parties. To be sure,
fair use is not a risk-free proposition—litigation has its own challenges.
But—as these cases show—this built-in exception to copyright offers one
partial solution for providing access to commercially unavailable and
orphan works.

II. OPEN ACCESS TO SCHOLARSHIP
Like the projects discussed above, the open-access movement
leverages a technological transformation to further the goal of “promoting
the progress.” The possibility of worldwide access to scholarship and
culture over the Internet makes it more pressing than ever to mark out zones
of freedom that ensure meaningful access to copyrighted works. Thomas
Jefferson, shown the technology of the Internet, might well have agreed.
Consider his words:
He who receives an idea from me, receives instruction himself without
lessening mine; as he who lights his taper at mine, receives light
without darkening me. That ideas should freely spread from one to
another over the globe, for the moral and mutual instruction of man,
and improvement of his condition, seems to have been peculiarly and
benevolently designed by nature, when she made them, like fire,
expansible over all space, without lessening their density in any point,

70

See INTERNET POLICY TASK FORCE, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, COPYRIGHT
POLICY, CREATIVITY, AND INNOVATION IN THE DIGITAL ECONOMY 33 (2013),
http://www.uspto.gov/news/publications/copyrightgreenpaper.pdf
(“[M]ass
digitization presents significant economic opportunities in addition to cultural and
societal benefits. But given the large numbers of works involved, many of which
are protected by copyright, individual licensing negotiations will not always be
feasible.”).
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and like the air in which we breathe, move, and have our physical
being, incapable of confinement or exclusive appropriation.71

While fair use’s flexibilities—discussed in the previous section—
empower users, the open-access movement starts with choices made by
authors. Its infrastructure relies on standardized, simple, and machinereadable licenses that allow authors to choose and connect a range of
freedoms with their works. These licenses, introduced by the non-profit
Creative Commons (“CC”) just over a decade ago, provide a streamlined
way to grant permissions to the public. They are widely used by copyright
holders to specify usage rights, and are utilized within—and well beyond—
the open access movement; there are currently over 500 million works
available under CC licenses.72
The open-access movement discussed here uses such licenses to
promote the “free availability and unrestricted use” of scholarly literature,
such as academic and research articles.73 The goal of open access is to
maximize the dissemination and impact of knowledge, consistent with
copyright’s intent. At the same time, it benefits authors themselves by
reducing publication delays and increasing citation counts.74 Providing
unfettered access is especially appropriate in the context of scholarly
communications because their raison d’être is the advancement of
knowledge and discovery. Furthermore, scholars do not rely on traditional
copyright incentives: academics and scientists are generally remunerated by
their institutions or funders, not by the market.75 As Professor Michael
Carroll explained: “Authors write for impact. As scientific publishing has
migrated to digital networks, full open access better achieves scientific
authors' goals than does the traditional publishing model . . . .”76
Recent years have seen a flourishing of open access. The Public
Library of Science (“PLoS”)—a nonprofit publisher of open-access
scientific journals—has been especially successful, and its experience
suggests that open access publishing can be “viable, scalable, and
71

Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in 13 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 326, 333–34 (Albert Ellery Bergh ed., 1907).
72
See Creative Commons Wiki – 4.0, CREATIVE COMMONS,
http://wiki.creativecommons.org/4.0 (last visited December 22, 2013).
73
Peter Suber, Open Access Overview, SPARC OPEN ACCESS NEWSLETTER,
http://legacy.earlham.edu/~peters/fos/overview.htm (last revised Dec. 16, 2013).
74
Gunther Eysenbach, Citation Advantage of Open Access Articles, PLOS BIOLOGY
4(5):
e157
(2006),
http://www.plosbiology.org/article/info:doi/10.1371/
journal.pbio.0040157.
75
Michael W. Carroll, Why Full Open Access Matters, PLOS BIOLOGY 9(11):
e1001210
(2011),
http://www.plosbiology.org/article/info:doi/10.1371/
journal.pbio.1001210.
76
Id. at 2.
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sustainable.”77 PLoS publishes seven influential journals, including PLoS
ONE, the largest journal in the world.78 In 2012, PLoS published over
26,000 articles—a 62 percent increase over 2011—with over 5.3 million
monthly article views.79 This trajectory may signal a pivotal moment: In the
words of PLoS co-founder Michael Eisen, “We are close to a tipping point
with most members of the scientific community believing that Open Access
is the future.”80
This may also be a tipping point for open access to governmentfunded research. Back in 2008, the National Institutes of Health (“NIH”)
launched its Public Access Policy requiring that scientists submit all NIHfunded articles to the digital repository PubMed Central “immediately upon
acceptance for publication.”81 The manuscripts must then be accessible to
the public no later than one year after publication. To bolster this policy, the
NIH announced in 2012 that it would block further funding if publications
are not in compliance.82 In February 2013, the White House issued its own
memorandum directing federal agencies with over $100 million in annual
research and development expenditures to take steps toward making
federally-funded research “freely available to the public within one year of
publication.”83 Currently, there are at least 2,900,000 full-text articles
archived in PubMed Central, and the aggregate number of open-access
publications is multiplying both domestically and internationally.84

77

PLOS TENTH ANNIVERSARY PROGRESS UPDATE 2012–2013, at 3,
http://www.plos.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Progress-Update_FINAL_
hyperlinked-091813.pdf (last visited Dec. 24, 2013).
78
Id.
79
Id. at 5.
80
Id. at 2.
81
Public Access Policy, NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, http://publicaccess.nih.gov/
index.htm (last visited Dec. 22, 2013).
82
Sally Rockey, Improving Public Access to Research Results, NAT’L INSTS. OF
HEALTH EXTRAMURAL NEXUS (Nov. 16, 2012), http://nexus.od.nih.gov/all/
2012/11/16/improving-public-access-to-research-results/.
83
Michael Stebbins, Expanding Public Access to the Results of Federally Funded
Research, WHITE HOUSE OFF. OF SCI. & TECH. POL’Y BLOG (Feb. 22, 2013, 12:04
PM),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2013/02/22/expanding-public-accessresults-federally-funded-research.
84
PUBMED CENTRAL, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/ (last visited Dec. 22,
2013); see also Eric Archambault et al., Proportion of Open Access Peer-Reviewed
Papers at the European and World Levels — 2004–2011, SCIENCE-METRIX i (Aug.
2013),
http://www.science-metrix.com/pdf/SM_EC_OA_Availability_20042011.pdf (measuring the growth of open-access for “22 fields of knowledge,”
across “the European Research Area countries, Brazil, Canada, Japan, and the
US”).
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Also in 2013, both houses of Congress introduced identical Fair
Access to Science and Technology Research (“FASTR”) bills.85 FASTR
would broaden NIH’s policy by shortening the embargo period for
manuscripts to six months and applying the open access mandate to any
federal agency with over $100 million in extramural research expenditures.
Notably, FASTR seeks not only to enable access, but also “productive
reuse, including computational analysis by state-of-the-art technologies.”86
This would allow tools such as text-mining, data-mining, and linking to
truly revolutionize scientific discovery. Nonetheless, prognosticators give
FASTR only a 4 or 5 percent chance of enactment.87
Alongside the hobbled public domain, the burgeoning open access
movement creates a sister realm of freedom through a privately constructed
commons. Transaction costs on both sides are mitigated: Users do not need
to laboriously clear rights because permission has already been granted, and
the standardized licenses allow rights holders to efficiently specify the
freedoms they want to accompany their creations. These commons are no
less a part of the copyright scheme than the rights themselves. In fact, it is
the underlying rights that make the relevant licenses enforceable. Copyright
and commons—and rights and freedoms—are synergistic, not antagonistic.

III. ORPHAN WORKS REFORM
Orphan works present a particularly compelling case for reform.
Because the current copyright term far outlasts the commercial lifespan of
most creative output,88 there is a growing limbo of “orphan works” that are
still presumably under copyright, but for which the copyright owner cannot
be traced, making it impossible to ask for permission or negotiate licensing
terms.89 The public cannot use them without legal risk because copyright is
a “strict liability” system, meaning that a diligent effort to find the owner is
no defense.90 Libraries, historians, educators, writers, and filmmakers must
assume they are off limits. There is no downside to allowing uses of these
85

Fair Access to Science and Technology Research Act of 2013, H.R. 708, 113th
Cong. (2013); Fair Access to Science and Technology Research Act of 2013, S.
350, 113th Cong. (2013).
86
Id.
87
Prognosis for H.R. 708, GOVTRACK.US, https://www.govtrack.us/
congress/bills/113/hr708 (last visited December 22, 2013); Prognosis for S. 350,
GOVTRACK.US, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/ bills/113/s350 (last visited
December 22, 2013).
88
See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
89
See supra notes 29–30 and accompanying text.
90
See King Records, Inc. v. Bennett, 438 F. Supp. 2d 812, 852 (M.D. Tenn. 2006)
(“Liability for copyright infringement does not turn on the infringer's mental state
because a general claim for copyright infringement is fundamentally one founded
on strict liability.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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works, because there is no one to benefit from their exploitation. At the
same time, there is considerable downside to stalling reform: works are
literally disintegrating because of thwarted preservation projects, and
educational and creative pursuits are needlessly abandoned.91
This frustrates copyright’s intent of promoting progress: in the
words of the Copyright Office, “For good faith users, orphan works are a
frustration, a liability risk, and a major cause of gridlock in the digital
marketplace . . . . This outcome is difficult if not impossible to reconcile
with the objectives of the copyright system and may unduly restrict access
to millions of works that might otherwise be available to the public.”92 A
government report from the United Kingdom explained the problem in even
stronger terms:
The copyright system is locking away millions of works in this
category . . . . As long as this state of affairs continues, archives in old
formats (for instance celluloid film and audio tape) continue to decay,
and further delay to digitisation means some will be lost for good.
Beyond this cultural negligence, the unnecessary restriction on access
involved in orphan works can, when applied to scientific papers, even
affect life saving research . . . . Action on this issue cannot be deferred
any longer.93

Policymakers around the world have begun to respond. In 2012, the
European Union passed a new Directive that allows qualifying public
institutions to digitize, preserve, and make available the orphan works in
their collections, in accordance with their public-interest missions.94
However, it does not cover other groups who might make productive uses
of orphan works, such as artists, researchers, educators, or for-profit
initiatives. While this Directive is limited, it represents an important step
toward salvaging and guaranteeing access to these works.95

91

See BROOKS, supra note 37, at vi (“[H]istorical recordings are at risk of physical
loss as well as of passing, unnoticed, from the nation’s aural memory.”).
92
Orphan Works and Mass Digitization, 77 Fed. Reg. 64555, 64555 (Oct. 22,
2012).
93
IAN HARGREAVES, DIGITAL OPPORTUNITY: A REVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND GROWTH, U.K. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICE 38 (May 2011),
http://www.ipo.gov.uk/ipreview-finalreport.pdf.
94
Directive 2012/28, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October
2012 on Certain Permitted Uses of Orphan Works, 2012 O.J. (L 299) 5.
95
National legislatures have also taken steps to enable uses of orphan works.
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Hungary, India, Japan, Korea, and the United
Kingdom have enacted a variety of orphan works solutions. See INTERNET POLICY
TASK FORCE, supra note 70, at 31–32. China is also considering orphan works
reform. Id. at 32.
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Efforts in the United States to pass orphan works legislation have so
far failed. The Copyright Office, concerned that “the uncertainty
surrounding the ownership status of orphan works does not serve the
objectives of the copyright system,” is currently in the midst of a renewed
effort to assess “the state of play for orphan works” and advise Congress on
possible solutions.96 In a July 2013 report, the Commerce Department’s
Internet Policy Task Force signaled strong support for the Copyright
Office’s push: “[T]he time is ripe to address the orphan works issue, and to
ensure that the United States can play a leadership role in shaping
international thinking.”97 Nonetheless, some stakeholders are pessimistic
about the potential for consensus among the many interested parties.98
(Certainly, if the Copyright Office cannot find consensus, Congress is
unlikely to do so.)
Ironically, then, orphan works reform in the United States—
something that should in theory encounter less friction than fair use or open
licensing because no one is benefitting from the current system—has thus
far been thwarted by a different kind of gridlock. If domestic reform does
not succeed, then projects that enable access to orphan works—such as
Google Books and the HathiTrust Digital Library—become all the more
vital.

IV. CHARTING WHAT IS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN
As with orphan works reform, identifying and tagging older works
that are already in the public domain might seem relatively straightforward;
after all, it merely reaffirms the legal status quo. However, any generalized
efforts to do this are beset by two related problems. First, they face the
transaction costs described earlier—tracking down the relevant copyright
information (for example, the original authors, the chain of title, and details
about notices and renewals) can be difficult. Second, these hurdles produce
asymmetries and collective action problems. It is less burdensome for users
to pay individual licensing fees for out-of-copyright works, even if they are
legally unwarranted, than to collectively undertake the research or litigation
necessary to establish a work’s public domain status. In addition, an entity
gathering licensing fees for public domain works has strong incentives to
continue doing so, while the payees lack the incentives to mount an
96

Orphan Works, COPYRIGHT OFFICE, http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/ (last
visited December 22, 2013).
97
INTERNET POLICY TASK FORCE, supra note 70, at 33.
98
LIBRARY COPYRIGHT ALLIANCE, REPLY COMMENTS OF THE LIBRARY COPYRIGHT
ALLIANCE TO THE COPYRIGHT OFFICE’S NOTICE OF INQUIRY CONCERNING ORPHAN
WORKS
AND
MASS
DIGITIZATION
1
(March
5,
2013),
http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/comments/noi_11302012/Library-CopyrightAlliance.pdf.
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expensive and time-consuming challenge. Nevertheless, some current
initiatives are overcoming these impediments.
The first involves books in the HathiTrust Digital Library.99 For incopyright titles, the libraries rely on fair use to enable searching,
preservation, and access for print-disabled patrons. For public domain
books, the libraries can go much further: they are free to make the full text
available to the general public, fulfilling copyright’s aim of allowing “full
possession and enjoyment . . . without restraint.”100 Accordingly, the
University of Michigan Library’s Copyright Review Management System
(“CRMS”) is working to certify public domain titles in the HathiTrust
corpus.101
While works published before 1923 are conclusively in the public
domain, a substantial number of works published between 1923 and 1963
are also in the public domain because the copyright holder did not comply
with notice and renewal formalities.102 But in many cases, this freedom is
theoretical, not actual, because general users lack the tools to determine the
relevant facts. CRMS is tackling this problem by concentrating the
necessary research. It selects older books likely to be out of copyright, and
steadily gathers information relevant to determining public domain status.
Since 2008, it has identified almost 153,000 public domain titles published
between 1923 and 1963 in the United States.103 Its international project,
begun in 2012, has identified 40,000 public domain titles.104

99

See supra notes 65–69 and accompanying text.
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §
1147 (1833).
101
See Copyright Review Management System, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
LIBRARY, http://www.lib.umich.edu/copyright-review-management-system-imlsnational-leadership-grant (last visited December 22, 2013).
102
1909 Copyright Act, supra note 17, §§ 9, 18, 23; 17 U.S.C. § 304 (2012). For
works published between 1923 and 1963, the copyright term was only extended for
copyrights that already had been renewed. 17 U.S.C. § 304(b). Since only an
estimated 15 percent of copyrights were renewed, see Ringer, Renewal of
Copyright, supra note 32, at 187, 85 percent of works from that period had already
passed into the public domain. For works published between 1964 and 1977, the
law granted both a term extension and automatic renewal to all of the copyrights
still in their initial term. 17 U.S.C. § 304(a). This means that the 85 percent of
works that might have entered the public domain because their copyrights were not
renewed nevertheless remain under copyright. All works from 1923 to 1977 that
were published without a copyright notice are in the public domain, but this
information can be difficult to find.
103
E-mail from Kevin Smith, Scholarly Communications Officer at Duke
University, to author (November 16, 2013, 8:23 EST) (on file with author).
104
Id.
100
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Alongside such larger-scale endeavors are individual lawsuits
seeking judgments that particular works are actually in the public domain.
Two cases from 2013 illustrate the high transaction costs involved in
determining public domain status, as they do not deal with obscure works
but with famous pieces of culture: the song “Happy Birthday to You,” and
the characters Sherlock Holmes and Dr. Watson.
“Happy Birthday to You” has been anointed the most popular song
of the twentieth century, and the most frequently sung song in the English
language.105 Warner/Chappell Music, Inc. claims copyright in the song until
2030, and collects an estimated $2 million in annual licensing fees.106 In
June 2013, a documentary film company—one of many that have faced
demands for licensing fees when people sing “Happy Birthday” in their
films—filed a lawsuit seeking a declaratory judgment that “Happy Birthday
to You” is in the public domain.107 It cites evidence that the melody was
first published in 1893 (for a different song called “Good Morning to All”),
and the lyrics were first published in 1911, although it is unclear who (or
whom) actually married the melody and lyrics.108 Regardless of who the
rightful authors were, any copyright claims over the full song appear to
have long since expired.
This lawsuit draws from a 2009 article by law professor Robert
Brauneis that, through exhaustive research, unearthed historical documents
showing multiple defects in the “Happy Birthday” copyright claim.109 The
details are exceedingly technical, but the gravamen is as follows.
Warner/Chappell’s copyright is premised on registrations from 1935, when
copyright ownership was conditioned on proper notice and renewal. The
evidence suggests that the 1935 registrations may themselves be invalid
either because they did not cover the first authorized publication of the song
or because the copyright notices were otherwise defective.110 Even
assuming their initial validity, the only registrations from 1935 that were
properly renewed cover musical additions specific to new piano
arrangements of the song, not the familiar melody and lyrics that are still

105

Robert Brauneis, Copyright and the World's Most Popular Song, 56 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y USA 335, 356 (2009).
106
Id. at 359, 365.
107
Complaint, Good Morning to You Prods. Corp. v. Warner/Chappell Music, Inc.,
No. 13-4040 (S.D.N.Y. June 13, 2013).
108
Id. at 3–16. The complaint contains a wealth of additional historical information.
109
Brauneis, supra note 105. Many of the copyright claim’s problems are related to
a lack of evidence about authorship. Professor Brauneis also found that
Warner/Chappell may not be a rightful owner because it cannot trace its title to the
original authors of the song. Id. at 339.
110
Id. at 369–395.
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generating licensing revenue.111 As the complexity of Professor Brauneis’
full analysis demonstrates, the challenges associated with determining
copyright status present a daunting task even for legal experts.
The case involving Sherlock Holmes and Dr. Watson also deals
with material from the 19th century. The characters were first introduced in
1887, and featured in fifty pre-1923 works (four novels and forty-six
stories).112 Under rudimentary copyright law, all of the material within those
stories, including Sherlock Holmes’ penchant for disguise, uncanny
reasoning skills, and friendship with Watson, is in the public domain.113
Any new character traits added in the ten post-1923 stories (for example,
Holmes’ retirement and Dr. Watson’s second wife) would be copyrighted,
but the original characters are in the public domain. Nevertheless, the
Conan Doyle estate has continued to collect licensing fees for them. Leslie
Klinger, a Holmes scholar, declined to pay these fees and asked for a
judgment that Holmes and Watson are in the public domain.114
While the questions in the “Happy Birthday” case turned on a series
of copyright technicalities, the Holmes case presents a novel legal
argument. The Conan Doyle estate claims that while all of the dialogue,
artifacts, and story lines from the pre-1923 stories are indeed in the public
domain, a “character is a work of authorship separate from the stories,” and
the copyright term does not commence for characters until “the creation of
the characters [is] complete.”115 Thus, they maintain, because Holmes’
character development continued in a handful of post-1923 stories, his
entire character—including all of the core aspects fully developed in the
earlier stories—remains copyrighted.
This remarkable theory would create a special—and unknowable—
term of copyright for characters. Long after the stories in which they appear
enter the public domain, literary characters could remain copyrighted as
long as their owners keep tweaking them in subsequent books. Future
creators would find it impossible to determine when characters enter the
public domain, because any incremental change would keep the copyright
111

Id. at 395–409.
Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment at
1, 5, Klinger v. Conan Doyle Estate, Ltd., No. 13-1226, 2013 WL 6824923 (N.D.
Ill. Dec. 23, 2013).
113
Id. at 5–8. See also 17 U.S.C. § 304 (2012).
114
Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Klinger, No. 13-1226. Mr. Klinger
was co-editing a collection of stories inspired by the Holmes tales and contends that
“Holmes and Watson belong to the world, not to some distant relatives of Arthur
Conan Doyle.” FREE SHERLOCK! (February 14, 2013), http://freesherlock.com/2013/02/14/free-sherlock/.
115
Response in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 3,
Klinger, No. 13-1226.
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clock ticking.116 Ironically, though, writers such as Conan Doyle could also
be harmed: If copyright over characters doesn’t begin until they are
“completely created,” then the logical extension is that those characters are
not copyrighted at all before then (in the case of Conan Doyle, during the
decades between 1887 and 1927). Perhaps the public can make free use of
Harry Potter now, if there is a chance that J.K. Rowling might resurrect him
in a later book. (At any rate, this legal theory is so bizarre that it would take
a Sherlock Holmes to make sense of it.)
As this Article went to print, the court issued its decision: As of
December 23, 2013, the original Holmes and Watson characters are, in fact,
free for all to build upon. In the court’s words: “It is a bedrock principle of
copyright that once work enters the public domain it cannot be appropriated
as private (intellectual) property, and even the most creative of legal
theories cannot trump this tenet. Having established that all but the Ten
[post-1923] Stories have passed into the public domain, this Court
concludes that the Pre-1923 Story Elements are free for public use.”117 The
Sherlock Holmes character introduced in 1887 is officially in the public
domain. But it took the expense and transaction costs associated with a
court case to confirm this relatively straightforward proposition.
The CRMS project and these two lawsuits represent isolated
attempts to amass the evidence necessary to certify that certain older works
are in fact free for public use. They have managed to overcome transaction
costs and collective action problems through relatively idiosyncratic means.
CRMS benefits from grant funding and the tireless contribution of a
distributed network of research librarians. The two lawsuits rely on the
persistence of the plaintiffs and their lawyers. The “Happy Birthday”
challenge builds upon the years of research that went into Professor
Brauneis’ article, and the lawyers in the Sherlock Holmes case were tasked
with defeating novel legal theories. All of these efforts simultaneously point
to the problems caused by the long copyright term and related transaction
costs, and offer intriguing solutions. However, their prevalence and
efficiency are limited by the absence of a more streamlined method for
establishing copyright validity. Unlike the other efforts discussed in this
Article (capitalizing on fair use, open licenses, or orphan works legislation),
these instances may not suggest scalable solutions.118
116

Does copyright get extended for James Bond every time he develops a new
romantic interest or martini preference? For Superman if he gains a new
superpower or gets married? Who knows when a character is “complete”?
117
Klinger, No. 13-1226, 2013 WL 6824923 at *7 (internal quotations and citations
omitted).
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Of course, reinstating the requirement that copyright owners provide notice of
their claims would help to alleviate the lack of legal certainty about copyright status
going forward.
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CONCLUSION
From one perspective, the outlook for the public domain is rather
bleak. As I pointed out in the Introduction, no published works are entering
the U.S. public domain until 2019, and, remarkably, the Supreme Court
ruled in 2012 that Congress may even remove material from the public
domain,119 despite previous Supreme Court cases that suggested this was
impermissible.120 And this suppression is happening just as the Internet and
digital technologies offer unprecedented opportunities to preserve, catalog,
and share our culture, or at least those parts of it not currently being
economically exploited. Despite these developments, the situation is in fact
more complex. This Article has described an array of initiatives helping to
realize copyright law’s vision of “promoting broad public availability of
literature, music, and the other arts.”121
To be sure, these breathing spaces are only a partial solution.
Shortening the copyright term would more directly restore the public
domain’s role in “promoting the progress.” Economists modeling the
copyright term have estimated that its optimal length is closer to the original
term of 14 years in our first copyright law—many decades shorter than the
current term.122 After such “limited times,” economists tell us, continued
protection offers increasingly negligible incentives to most authors, while
unnecessarily keeping works from the public.123 In addition to recalibrating
the copyright term, reintroducing formalities that require claimants to
furnish basic copyright information would greatly reduce the transaction
costs associated with licensing and use, particularly if accompanied by
centralized copyright registries and better-maintained records. These
proposals are especially timely, as the United States is currently exploring a
wide-ranging update to our copyright laws.124 Hopefully, lawmakers will
seriously consider such measures.
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See supra notes 8–14 and accompanying text.
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As long as the current gridlock remains in place, however,
initiatives that exploit neighboring flexibilities become an essential means
for achieving copyright’s objectives. This Article examines a range of
examples. Projects that harness fair use’s freedoms work within one of
copyright’s especially adaptive exceptions. Open access to scholarship
relies on a privately constructed commons, built upon authors’ rights.
Orphan works reforms respond to a stark dysfunction where the law is
“blocking the progress” and impeding productive access to millions of
works without benefitting any rights holders. Finally, charting what is
already in the public domain uncovers its existing riches through particular
diligence. From this author’s perspective at least, all of these efforts are
bringing us closer to what we should be celebrating on Public Domain Day.

licensing, improving Copyright Office deposits and record keeping, and fostering
opt-out systems such as extended collective licensing.

